16% of RPKI-covered IPv4 routes still allow a forged-origin hijack that passes validation, the setup behind the Virtualizor update attackhttps://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/1x7i0l6/16_of_rpkicovered_ipv4_routes_still_allow_a
Author here, I work at IPinfo. some security-relevant highlights part of the post: The August 28 Virtualizor update attack used a forged-origin /24 inside Hetzner’s space. From what we saw, it was RPKI-valid because Hetzner’s ROA covered the /16 and allowed announcements down to /24, and no real /24 existed to compete with it. We also measured how common that setup is. In this case, of 855,217 RPKI-covered IPv4 routes, 138,698 (16.2%) have a ROA looser than the route announced and no more-specific route of their own filling the gap. For IPv6 it’s 20.9%. That’s roughly 18 million more-…